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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
ROSENN, Circuit Judge. 
 
The three appellants in the present matter were 
defendants in an action brought by the Securities and 
 
Exchange Commission (SEC) in the United States District 
Court for the District of New Jersey. The district court 
granted summary judgment in favor of the SEC against all 
the defendants on the issues of both liability and damages.1 
Susan Lachance and Howard Ackerman, two of the 
defendants, appeal from both the judgment of liability and 
the disgorgement order; Lionel Reifler appeals only from the 
order of disgorgement. Although the appellants raise a 
number of issues, our principal concern is with their 
challenge to the district court's order of disgorgement. We 
affirm. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. The district court had jurisdiction over this action pursuant to 28 
U.S.C. S 1331 and 15 U.S.C. SS 77v and 78aa (granting federal district 
courts exclusive jurisdiction over cases involving violations of the 
Securities Act of 1933 and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 
respectively). We have appellate jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 
S 1291. 
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I. 
 
Between 1968 and 1976, Lionel Reifler had six felony 
convictions for crimes including securities fraud, tax 
evasion, sale of unregistered securities and operation of an 
unregistered brokerage firm. His wife, Susan Lachance, is 
involved in a number of business ventures, independently 
and with her husband. She is the sole owner and president 
of Susan Lachance Industrial Design (SLID) and she is the 
president of Flat Rock Developers, Inc. (Flat Rock), a 
corporation formed by Lachance, Reifler, Gilbert Beall and 
Frederic Mascolo. Howard Ackerman, a bookkeeper, has 
been employed by Reifler since March, 1984; he shared a 
suite of offices with Reifler and Lachance and served as the 
bookkeeper for the Hughes Capital Corporation (Hughes) 
from its inception. 
 
In 1985, Reifler and two other defendants, Beall and 
Mascolo, acquired Hughes, a Florida shell corporation, as a 
vehicle for a public stock offering.2 John Knoblauch became 
Hughes' "nominal owner and chairman of the board of 
directors." Reifler and the others amended Hughes' 
Registration Statement, changing the stock-to-warrant ratio 
from 1:3 to 1:21. Hughes then announced a public offering 
of the stock. The defendants, including Lachance and 
Ackerman, purchased at least 88% of the stock sold in the 
public offering. 
 
In 1986, a public relations firm hired by the Reiflers 
issued press releases announcing Hughes' plans to 
purchase four other businesses; these press releases did 
not mention that the acquisition candidates were all owned 
and controlled by affiliates of Hughes. Among the 
companies named as acquisition candidates were SLID and 
Flat Rock. In one press release, Lachance represented, as 
president of SLID, that SLID was in good financial shape (in 
fact, it had only just emerged from bankruptcy) and was 
being acquired by Hughes, which had sufficient capital to 
purchase SLID and expand its business. In a press release 
issued on behalf of Flat Rock, Lachance, using her married 
name of "Susan Reifler," similarly represented that Flat 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
2. A more complete statement of the facts is available in Wiley v. Hughes 
Capital Corp., 746 F. Supp. 1264 (D.N.J. 1990). 
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Rock was an active concern (in fact, it was dormant and 
had no revenue at the time of the press release) and that 
Hughes had sufficient capital to acquire the business and 
to expand its real estate holdings. In neither press release 
did Lachance reveal her marital connection to Reifler or her 
status as a principal shareholder in Hughes. 
 
Ackerman, as the bookkeeper, admits that he executed 
most of the transactions necessary to perpetuate the 
fraudulent scheme. He transferred money among the 
various bank accounts held by Reifler, Lachance and the 
other participants in the Hughes stock sale, although he 
acknowledged that many of these transactions had no 
legitimate business purpose. He obtained cashier's checks 
with money from some of these accounts to purchase stock 
and warrants for nominee accounts in the names of various 
Reifler associates, including himself, Reifler, Lachance, 
Lachance's minor daughter, and Reifler's housekeeper. 
 
After the price of the stock rose, warrants were sold from 
the accounts controlled by Reifler and his cohorts into the 
public market. Ackerman deposited most of the proceeds of 
these sales, approximately $1.15 million, into various 
accounts held by himself, Reifler, Lachance and others. The 
money was then transferred from account to account and 
withdrawn in small amounts by Ackerman and the other 
participants in the stock fraud scheme. Eventually, the 
scheme was uncovered. A number of the participants, 
including Reifler, were criminally prosecuted; all of the 
participants were sued civilly, both by the SEC in the 
present action and in a class action suit brought by the 
defrauded purchasers of Hughes stock. 
 
II. 
 
We exercise plenary review over a district court's order 
granting summary judgment. Bieregu v. Reno, 59 F.3d 
1445, 1449 (3d Cir. 1995); United States v. Koreh, 59 F.3d 
431, 438 (3d Cir. 1995). "On review the appellate court is 
required to apply the same test the district court should 
have utilized initially." Goodman v. Mead Johnson & Co., 
534 F.2d 566, 573 (3d Cir. 1976). 
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The standard for summary judgment is well-established: 
Summary judgment may be granted only "if the pleadings, 
depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on 
file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is 
no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the 
moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." 
Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). When considering a motion for 
summary judgment, the court must view all evidence in 
favor of the non-moving party. Bixler v. Central Pa. 
Teamsters Health & Welfare Fund, 12 F.3d 1292, 1297 (3d 
Cir. 1993). Additionally, all doubts must be resolved in 
favor of the non-moving party. Meyer v. Riegel Prods. Corp., 
720 F.2d 303, 307 (3d Cir. 1983). The party challenging the 
motion for summary judgment must be able to produce 
evidence that, "when considered in light of that party's 
burden of proof at trial, could be the basis for a jury finding 
in that party's favor." Kline v. First W. Gov't Sec., 24 F.3d 
480, 485 (3d Cir. 1994). 
 
A. 
 
In the present matter, the district court granted the 
SEC's motion for summary judgment on the charge that 
Lachance violated 15 U.S.C. S 77q(a)(2). This section, also 
known as Section 17(a)(2) of the Securities Act of 1933, 
provides in pertinent part: 
 
       (a) It shall be unlawful for any person in the offer or 
       sale of any securities by the use of any means or 
       instruments of transportation or communication in 
       interstate commerce or by the use of the mails, directly 
       or indirectly 
 
       * * * 
        (2) to obtain money or property by means of any 
       untrue statement of a material fact or any omission to 
       state a material fact necessary in order to make the 
       statements made, in the light of the circumstances in 
       which they were made, not misleading. 
 
Thus, this section bars the use of untrue statements or the 
omission of material statements of fact which are 
misleading. As the district court properly stated, omissions 
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and misstatements are material if there is a substantial 
likelihood that the omitted or misstated facts would have 
been "viewed by the reasonable investor as having 
significantly altered the `total mix' of information available." 
Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 231-32 (1988) (quoting 
TSC Indus., Inc. v. Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438, 449 
(1976)). 
 
A violation of S 77q(a)(2) can be established by a showing 
of negligence. Aaron v. SEC, 446 U.S. 680, 701-02 (1980); 
Finkel v. Stratton Corp., 962 F.2d 169, 175 (2d Cir. 1992). 
Lachance concedes that she made false statements in the 
two press releases issued in relation to Hughes' purported 
acquisition of SLID and Flat Rock. Such information 
concerning Hughes' ability and intention to acquire two 
purportedly financially healthy corporations made Hughes' 
stock appear more attractive to prospective purchasers. She 
argues, however, that she believed these statements were 
true at the time she made them and that she did not act 
negligently in making them because she relied on the 
assertions of her husband and of other representatives of 
Hughes Capital. Thus, she argues that a genuine issue of 
material fact remains as to whether she was negligent in 
relying on information provided to her by her husband and 
others and this issue of material fact precludes summary 
judgment on the question of liability under S 77q(a)(2). 
 
It is doubtful that Lachance makes this argument 
seriously. She stated in her deposition that she was 
involved in formulating the two press releases and that she 
edited them. She, as president of SLID and Flat Rock, knew 
she was misrepresenting the financial status of each of 
these companies. She also knew that she was using two 
different names in the press releases, lending an 
impression that the companies were utterly separate 
concerns. Clearly, she knew that she was married to one of 
the principal forces behind Hughes, and she should have 
known that this relationship would be of interest to the 
stock-buying public. Presumably, she knew about her 
husband's criminal past, and certainly a cautious woman 
with that knowledge would question her husband's 
assertion that his current business venture was not 
fraudulent. Thus, she was at least negligent in failing to 
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mention her marriage to one of the principal backers of 
Hughes, her own personal stake in Hughes, and the 
financial status of SLID and Flat Rock, material omissions 
which invoke liability under S 77q(a)(2). 
 
Lachance further asserts that she did not make the 
statements regarding Hughes' financial strength negligently, 
because both Reifler and Knoblauch assured her that 
Hughes had sufficient capital to acquire the two companies. 
Lachance asserts that her reliance creates a genuine issue 
of material fact that should be tried before a jury. However, 
the facts here are not in dispute (she does not assert that 
she studied Hughes' books or checked the financial 
statements) and her reliance on the alleged assertions, if 
made, would not be deemed reasonable in the context of 
making financial statements so obviously intended to 
influence potential investors. "One who . . . supplies false 
information for the guidance of others in their business 
transactions, is subject to liability for pecuniary loss 
caused to them by their justifiable reliance upon the 
information, if he fails to exercise reasonable care or 
competence in obtaining or communicating the 
information." Restatement (Second) of Torts S 552 (1977). A 
number of states have adopted this Restatement Rule as 
the standard for determining liability for a negligent 
misrepresenatation.3 
 
A reasonable businesswoman selling her company would 
certainly not rely only on the assertions of the purchaser 
that he had sufficient capital to complete the acquisition; 
rather, a reasonable businesswoman would undertake 
some investigation of the financial status of the entity with 
which she was negotiating. Here, Lachance admits that she 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
3. Some of the states are noted in the following cases: Pulte Home Corp. 
v. Osmose Wood Preserving, Inc., 60 F.3d 734, 740, n. 16 (11th Cir. 
1995) (Florida); Petrillo v. Bachenberg, 655 A.2d 1354, 1360 (1995) (New 
Jersey); Rocky Mountain Helicopters v. Bell Helicopter, 24 F.3d 125, 130 
(10th Cir. 1994) (Texas); Arthur Children's Trust v. Keim, 994 F.2d 1390, 
1400 (9th Cir. 1993) (Arizona); Jordan-Milton Machinery v. F/V Teresa 
Marie, II, 978 F.2d 32, 36 (1st Cir. 1992) (Maine); J.E. Mamiyee Sons, 
Inc. 
v. Fidelity Bank, 813 F.2d 610, 615 (3d Cir. 1987) (Pennsylvania); Abell 
v. Potomac Ins. Co., 858 F.2d 1104, 1131 (5th Cir. 1988) (Louisiana), 
vacated on other grounds, 492 U.S. 914 (1989). 
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did not undertake any investigation of Hughes' financial 
condition, but rather simply trusted the assertions of her 
convicted-felon husband and his business partner in a 
sham corporation. There are no disputed facts which could 
alter this conclusion. Therefore, we perceive no error in the 
district court's grant of summary judgment on this count. 
 
B. 
 
The district court also granted the SEC's motion for 
summary judgment on the charge that Ackerman violated 
15 U.S.C. S 77q(a)(3). This section, also known as Section 
17(a)(3) of the Securities Act of 1933, provides in pertinent 
part: 
 
       (a) It shall be unlawful for any person in the offer or 
       sale of any securities by the use of any means or 
       instruments of transportation or communication in 
       interstate commerce or by the use of the mails, directly 
       or indirectly. 
 
       * * * 
 
       (3) to engage in any transaction, practice, or course of 
       business which operates or would operate as a fraud or 
       deceit upon the purchaser. 
 
Similar to S 77q(a)(2), scienter is not required for a violation 
of this section; negligence is sufficient to establish a 
violation of S 77q(a)(3). Aaron, 446 U.S. at 701-02; Finkel, 
962 F.2d at 175. 
 
Ackerman argues that he did not act negligently when he 
assisted Reifler and the others to purchase almost the 
entire IPO while keeping quiet their own involvement in 
Hughes and then assisted them in reselling the stocks to 
the general public and redistributing the profits. He 
obtained cashier's checks with which to purchase the IPO 
but directed that his name not appear on these cashier's 
checks as the purchaser; rather, the cashier's checks bore 
the names of the nominee account holders. He transferred 
the proceeds of the sale among the various accounts held 
by those involved in the Hughes scheme, even though he 
concedes that these transactions had no apparent business 
purpose. Yet, Ackerman has employed a Nuremberg defense 
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by arguing that he simply did what he was told and was 
not in a position to question the orders given to him by his 
employer, Reifler. He further argues that he has no 
background or knowledge in securities and thus did not 
find any of the transactions suspicious. 
 
Regardless of Ackerman's purported lack of knowledge or 
his assertion that he was just being a good soldier and 
following orders, the undisputed facts establish that the 
transactions were so clearly suspicious that Ackerman was 
negligent in continuing to complete the transactions that 
helped further the fraud. Among the indicia of fraud that 
Ackerman should have picked up on: (1) use of the aliases 
by various parties (including Reifler's purchase of stock as 
"Lionel Lachance"); (2) stock purchases by unlikely parties 
(such as Reifler's minor daughter, Reifler's housekeeper, 
and a number of corporations Ackerman knew lacked 
operating capital); (3) the lack of business purpose to a 
number of the transactions made; and (4) the need to hide 
himself as purchaser of the cashier's checks with which the 
IPO purchase was completed. There are no disputed facts 
that would establish that Ackerman did not act negligently 
in ignoring all these clear indicators of questionable 
behavior. Therefore, the district court did not err in 
granting summary judgment on this count against 
Ackerman. 
 
III. 
 
The district court held that Lachance would be jointly 
and severally liable for the disgorgement of the 
approximately $1.4 million in illegal profits traceable to the 
securities fraud. Lachance argues that the evidence failed 
to establish that she received anything more than $85,000 
in fraud proceeds and that it is unfair to order her to be 
jointly and severally liable for any amount above that 
figure. Lachance argues that this result is particularly 
unfair in light of the finding that she acted only negligently, 
and not with scienter, regarding the fraud. A district court's 
order of disgorgement is reviewed for abuse of discretion. 
CFTC v. American Metals Exchange Corp., 991 F.2d 71, 76 
(3d Cir. 1993). Our review of the granting of summary 
judgment is plenary. Id. 
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"Disgorgement is an equitable remedy designed to deprive 
a wrongdoer of his unjust enrichment and to deter others 
from violating securities laws." SEC v. First City Fin. Corp., 
890 F.2d 1215, 1230 (D.C. Cir. 1989). When apportioning 
liability among multiple tortfeasors, it is appropriate to hold 
all tortfeasors jointly and severally liable for the full amount 
of the damage unless the liability is reasonably 
apportioned. "Where joint tortfeasors cause a single and 
indivisible harm for which there is no reasonable basis for 
division according to the contribution of each, each 
tortfeasor is subject to liability for the entire harm." United 
States v. Alcan Aluminum Corp., 964 F.2d 252, 268-69 (3d 
Cir. 1992). 
 
Courts have held that joint-and-several liability is 
appropriate in securities cases when two or more 
individuals or entities collaborate or have close 
relationships in engaging in the illegal conduct. See First 
Jersey Securities, 101 F.3d at 1475; Hateley v. SEC, 8 F.3d 
653, 656 (9th Cir. 1993). In the instant case, the 
defendants all collaborated in a single scheme to defraud 
Hughes' investors through the bogus initial public offering 
and the subsequent sale of warrants. They enjoyed a"close 
relationship" with each other through their connection to 
Hughes, the other corporations used in the scheme, and 
the nominee accounts used to perpetuate the scheme. 
 
The burden is on the tortfeasor to establish that the 
liability is capable of apportionment, Alcan, 964 F.2d at 
269, and the district court has broad discretion in 
subjecting the offending parties on a joint-and-several basis 
to the disgorgement order. S.E.C. v. First Jersey Securities, 
Inc., 101 F.3d 1450, 1475 (2d Cir. 1996), petition for cert. 
filed, 65 U.S.L.W. 3799 (U.S. May 23, 1997) (No. 96-1862). 
Imposing the burden upon the defendant of proving the 
propriety of the apportionment of the disgorgement amount 
in securities cases is appropriate and reasonable. Although 
in some cases, a court may be able easily to identify the 
recipient of ill-gotten profits and apportionment is practical, 
that is not usually the case. Generally, apportionment is 
difficult or even practically impossible because defendants 
have engaged in complex and heavily disguised 
transactions. See CFTC v. American Bd., 803 F.2d 1242, 
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1252 (2d Cir. 1986). Very often defendants move funds 
through various accounts to avoid detection, use several 
nominees to hold securities or improperly deprived profits, 
or intentionally fail to keep accurate records and refuse to 
cooperate with investigators in identifying the illegal profits. 
Hence, "the risk of uncertainty should fall on the wrongdoer 
whose illegal conduct created that uncertainty." First City 
Financial Corp., 890 F.2d at 1232. 
 
In the present matter, Lachance has failed to carry her 
burden of establishing that the liability can be apportioned. 
The only documentary evidence that Lachance has offered 
to establish the apportionment of liability -- the 
photocopies of the admittedly altered check stubs and the 
summary of those photocopies -- was properly ruled 
inadmissible by the district court, as discussed in the next 
section. The only other evidence offered by Lachance is her 
own testimony that she did not receive that much money 
from the scheme. Not only can Lachance not support her 
testimony with specific facts or documentary evidence, her 
testimony is contradicted by strong evidence showing she 
received substantially more than $85,000. 
 
The division of liability is an intensely factual 
determination, and summary judgment can be granted only 
when it is clear that no genuine issue of material fact 
regarding the apportionment of liability remains. As noted 
above, the burden is on the party challenging disgorgement 
-- in this case, Lachance -- to establish the manner in 
which liability should properly have been apportioned. 
Lachance's mere assertions that she did not receive the 
benefit of this money, in light of substantial evidence to the 
contrary (her acknowledgment that Reifler paid all 
household expenses, their lavish lifestyle, and expensive 
automobiles) does not create a triable issue of fact. In this 
matter, the amount of illegal proceeds is not in dispute. 
Rather, the only issue presented is whether Lachance 
should be subject to joint and several liability for the entire 
amount. When there is no documentary evidence to 
contradict the clear evidence that Lachance benefited 
substantially from this scheme and where Lachance has 
failed to set forth "specific facts showing there is a genuine 
issue for trial," the district court did not err in granting 
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summary judgment holding Lachance joint and severally 
liable for the disgorgement of the illegal proceeds of the 
securities fraud. 
 
IV. 
 
The district court refused to admit the proffered evidence 
that the defendants assert would establish the distribution 
of the proceeds from the securities fraud. Our review of a 
district court's ruling on an evidentiary matter is subject to 
the abuse of discretion standard. 
 
The defendants assert that the court erred in refusing to 
admit photocopies of check stubs, arguing that these were 
admissible pursuant to Federal Rules of Evidence 803(6), 
the business records exception. They further assert that 
photocopies of these check stubs are admissible pursuant 
to Rule 1003, which admits duplicates "to the same extent 
as an original unless (1) a genuine question is raised as to 
the authenticity of the original or (2) in the circumstances 
it would be unfair to admit the duplicate in lieu of the 
original." 
 
Ackerman admits that the check stubs were "altered" 
before photocopying. Defendants assert that Ackerman's 
notations were a matter of reconciling the accounts, and 
the alterations did not affect the accuracy of the payee or 
amount of the checks themselves. However, there is 
nothing to support this assertion, and Ackerman himself 
testified that he cannot remember what information on the 
stubs was changed prior to photocopying. The defendants 
further assert that the canceled checks themselves will bear 
out the accuracy of these stubs; the canceled checks, 
however, could not be located in response to requests for 
them in discovery and thus the defendants cannot rely on 
missing evidence to support the authenticity of photocopies 
of admittedly altered check stubs. Given this scenario, it 
would be impossible to say that the district court abused 
its discretion in concluding that the photocopies of the 
check stubs indicated "a lack of trustworthiness" and thus 
were not admissible under Rule 803(6). 
 
Accordingly, it was not an abuse of discretion for the 
district court to further refuse to admit the summary 
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exhibit that the defendants sought to admit pursuant to 
Rule 1006, which was based primarily on the altered check 
stubs. The summary was based on information which the 
court deemed inadmissible for lack of trustworthiness, a 
ruling which was not an abuse of discretion. Therefore, the 
district court did not abuse its discretion by refusing to 
admit a summary based on inadmissible evidence. 
Consequently, neither of the district court's challenged 
evidentiary issues were an abuse of discretion. 
 
V. 
 
Accordingly, for the reasons set forth above, we see no 
error in the district court's grants of summary judgment in 
favor of the Securities and Exchange Commission. 
Moreover, the district court did not err in holding Lachance 
jointly and severally liable for the disgorgement of the illegal 
proceeds of the securities fraud and in its evidentiary 
rulings. The judgment of the district court will be affirmed. 
The memorandum opinion of this court filed July 9, 1997 
will be vacated and this will be the opinion of the court. 
 Costs will be taxed against the appellants. 
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